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INSIDER TRADING, REGULATION AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK 
SPREAD 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Insiders pose a risk to providers of liquidity, who require compensation for this and 
consequentially widen spreads. In this paper we investigate the relationship between 
insider trading regulation and the cost of trading by decomposing the components of 
the spread before and after the enactment of strict new laws. We find a significant 
decrease in information asymmetry, which is mainly observed in illiquid and high pre-
change information asymmetry companies. Results are robust to model specification. 
We also see a decrease in the contribution of information asymmetry to price 
volatility. Overall, our results may have implications for markets with similar 
characteristics.    
 
JEL Codes : C22, D82, G18. 
Keywords: Insider Trading Laws, Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition, Regulatory 
Change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The bid-ask spread, or the difference between the lowest offered price to sell and 
highest price to buy, is a measure of the price concession a trader must make for 
immediacy in a transaction (Demsetz, 1968). This spread is generally seen as 
consisting of three cost components, order-processing, inventory-holding and 
information asymmetry costs. While the first two costs, often referred to as real 
frictions, are directs costs the provider of immediacy incurs, the last component is 
compensation for trading with a better informed counterpart (Stoll, 2000). If 
unregulated, insider trading (trades by directors, executives and large shareholders) 
can represent a large proportion of the last component and can increase the cost of 
trading markedly. In illiquid markets, where insiders may represent a substantial 
proportion of trades, the impact on spreads would be even more detrimental for the 
market as a whole. In such markets, effective regulation may reduce information 
asymmetry, spreads and increase overall market efficiency.   
 
Because of the damaging effects of insider trading, 80% of countries with 
financial markets have regulations that limit this behavior (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002). It has also been shown that such laws reduce the harm from insider trading in 
a number of areas such as reducing the cost of capital (Bhattacharya and Daouk,  
2002), increased liquidity, more accurate prices and wider share ownership (Beny,  
2005), and increased analyst following (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2005). 
Further, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find that firms with more prevalent insider 
trading have wider spreads. This supports the theoretical models of Copeland and 
Galai (1983), Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and others, that establish 
a positive relationship between informed trading, information asymmetry and 
spreads. While the relationship between informed trading and spreads has been well 
established, the role of regulation and its impact on the components of the spread 
remains unexplored. The effect reduction such regulation may have on information 
asymmetry is of particular relevance to small and illiquid markets. In this paper we 
address this issue within such a setting. 
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Our first and main contribution is to explore the effect insider trading regulation 
has on the cost of trading. In particular, we are interested in how a change in 
regulation affects the information asymmetry component of the spread. Changes in 
regulations are not observed frequently. However, in 2002, New Zealand changed its 
legislation with respect to insider trading (Securities Market Amendment Act 2002) 
providing a prime opportunity to investigate this issue. We apply the Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans (1997), hereafter MRR, decomposition model to a sample 
of 70 of the most liquid New Zealand Stock Exchange listed companies before and 
after the introduction of significantly stricter insider trading regulations. We find a 
significant drop in the proportion of information asymmetry following the introduction 
of the new legislation. Conjointly, we observe a decrease in the spread and a 
significant decline in the contribution of information asymmetry to price volatility. As 
our second contribution, we separate the sample based on liquidity (number of 
trades) and pre-change information asymmetry. We find a large significant decrease 
in the most illiquid firms and those with the largest asymmetry, indicating that the 
regulation was most effective for these firms. Finally, because estimated components 
are sensitive to model specification (see De Jong et al., 1996) we employ Glosten 
and Harris (1988) as a robustness check. Our results confirm the notions of La Porta 
et al. (2000), who state that government intervention is vital in reducing the 
prevalence and problems associated with insider trading. 
 
The purpose of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 (SMAA), enacted 
in December 2002 was to correct major weaknesses in the previously enacted 
legislation. Before the enactment, enforcement was left to individual traders and the 
issuing company, and only large block holders were obliged to disclose in a timely 
fashion. As a consequence, these laws were never successfully enforced and insider 
profitability was large. Among other changes, the new laws required continuous 
disclosure by all insiders and allowed the Securities Commission to prosecute 
insiders.i These were significant changes over the previous system and were enacted 
to reduce the prevalence of insider trading. The public enforcement by the Securities 
Commission should increase the chance of detection and prosecution making insider 
trading more costly. In addition, the continuous disclosure regime aims to reduce 
insider’s trading and their profits.  
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The changes enacted in December 2002 demonstrated a renewed political will 
to address this problem as well as fixing glaring weaknesses which had undermined 
the previous legislative regime. These represent key problems in a number of 
markets around the world (Stamp and Walsh, 1996) and evidence of the impact of 
policy changes may prove useful for those markets. Also as suggested by our 
results, the impact of regulation is particularly important as insiders make up a 
relatively greater proportion of trades in an illiquid market.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model applied in this paper. Section 3 details the data employed and gives some 
summary statistics on the sample. Section 3 lays out our findings while in section 4 
we conclude the paper.  
 
THE MODEL 
 
To compare information asymmetry components of the spreads we employ a 
decomposition model. Two common types of models have been developed. The first 
type relies on serial covariances of the time series of trades and quotes to 
decompose the spread (e.g. George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), Stoll (1989), Roll 
(1984)). The components could be inferred by analyzing how dealers update their 
quotes after a trade occurred. One weakness of these models, however, is their use 
of quoted spread rather than the more relevant traded spread, which is a better 
measure of the actual cost of trading. For this reason we use the second type of 
decomposition models, the trade indicator models.  
 
Trade indicator models rely on identifying whether a trade was buyer or seller 
initiated and relating that to changes in prices. Of this type there are three main 
models, Glosten and Harris (1988), MRR and Huang and Stoll (1997). Huang and 
Stoll (1997) propose a model which explicitly decomposes prices into all three of the 
costs commonly associated with spreads, order-processing, inventory-holding and 
information asymmetry. The explicit decomposition of the inventory-holding costs 
however, makes the model of Huang and Stoll (1997) inappropriate for use in a 
market with an electronic limit order book (LOB). In these markets inventory costs 
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play little or no role in the setting of prices. (Ahn, Cai, Hamao and Ho, 2002; Chung, 
Van Ness and Van Ness, 2004).  The models of Glosten and Harris and MRR, which 
have been applied to LOB markets (e.g. Ahn et al., de Jong, Nijman and Roell, 
1996), are more suitable as they model only two components, permanent price 
impacts, which cover information asymmetry, and transitory price effects, which 
covers both order-processing and any inventory-holding costs. The difference in the 
treatment of the inventory holding costs is the reason we prefer the Glosten and 
Harris and MRR models to that of Huang and Stoll. The Huang and Stoll model also 
results in a high proportion of implausible estimates providing another reason to rely 
on MRR and Glosten and Harris (Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr, 2001). 
 
Both MRR and Glosten and Harris (1988) rely on the assumption that the 
unobserved efficient price ( t ) is affected by two sources of information, private 
information held by informed traders and public market-wide information ( t ). When 
informed traders are present, the revelation of their information through order flow 
has a direct impact on revisions in the efficient price. Let xt be a trade indicator that is 
equal to 1 if a trade is buyer initiated, -1 if it is seller initiated and zero if a trade 
occurs within the spread. MRR argue that part of the order flow is predictable, 
therefore information asymmetry should be related to the proportion of order flow that 
comes as a surprise. They assume this surprise can be measured by [ ]1|- ttt xxEx , 
where [ ]1| tt xxE  is the expected trade direction conditional on the previous trade 
indicator and is measured by the first-order auto-correlation (i.e.   11|   ttt xxxE  ).ii 
Therefore the innovation in the efficient price is 
 
ttttt xx    )( 11 ,        (1) 
 
where   measures the information asymmetry. 
 
Liquidity providers, who face order processing and inventory costs associated 
with trading, provide quotes for the ask ( atp ) and bid (
b
tp ) prices at time t such that 
the post-trade expected transaction price is adjusted for their costs. The quoted 
prices can thus be defined as  
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tttt
a
t xxp    )( 11   
tttt
b
t xxp    )( 11  
 
for ask and bid, respectively, where   is the per share compensation for these 
costs. The traded price is a consequence of these quoted prices and is given as 
 
ttttttt xxxp    )( 11 ,     (2) 
 
where t captures the effects of price discreteness. Expressing (2) in first 
differences we obtain 
 
ttttttt uxxxxpp   )()( 111       (3) 
 
where 1 ttttu  .  
 
To estimate (3), we employ Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) using 
the orthogonality conditions  
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where  captures the drift in returns and ut follows from (3). The orthogonality 
conditions applied are essentially OLS conditions with an additional condition to 
identify ȡ. The advantage of using GMM is that it places no distributional 
assumptions resulting in more accurate standard errors. Since, the error term in (3) is 
auto-correlated, we control for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation in the standard 
errors using a Newey-West (1987) correction. In the estimation of the model we scale 
all price data by 100.  
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III. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
The New Zealand Exchange is one of the smallest and least liquid, developed market 
around the world  (see Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Over the course of our 
sample period, the exchange had between 149 and 164 domestic issuers of equity, 
with a market capitalisation in August 2004 of $NZ 37 billion. It also averaged 
between 40,000 and 60,000 trades per month valued at around NZ$2 billion. The 
market runs an electronic limit order book with no designated market makers. There 
are, however, a number of market participants that do act to provide liquidity in the 
market, although they have no regulatory obligation to do so. The exchange also 
runs a pre-opening session (between 9-10am) during which buys and sells can cross 
and the opening price is set to clear the market. There is also a post-close period 
(between 5-5:30pm) to allow for post-trading adjustment of orders, although price 
and trade changes are governed by a tight set of rules. As prices are set under 
different mechanisms in these periods we exclude all trades that fall outside the 
normal trading hours.  
 
We obtain intraday transaction data including the bid and ask quotes at the 
time of the trade from the New Zealand Exchange (NZX). The data contains the 
transaction price, volume, time of the trade (rounded to the nearest second) and the 
best bid and ask quote at the time of the trade. We restrict our sample to the 70 most 
liquid companies to ensure enough data is available to estimate the model. The 
selected companies had at least 5 trades per day over the total sample period. As 
the data does not contain information about whether trades are buyer or seller 
initiated, we use quotes to determine the trade indicator. This is accomplished by 
comparing the trade price to the prevailing bid/ask prices. Under this method trades 
inside the spread are left as undetermined. The matching classification rule of Lee 
and Ready (1991) cannot be applied in this case, because quotes were only 
available at the time of the trade.   
 
We examine the period from January 2001 to August 2004 which covers a 
period of roughly 2 years either side of the date of enactment, 1 December 2002. We 
examine two periods, pre-change and post-change. We employed two pre-change 
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periods for both the 12 and 18 month samples. This was a robustness check to test 
for possible potential pre-emption of the benefits of the act as the probability of its 
enactment increased. The first pre-change samples ran from December 2001 (12 
month sample) and June 2001 (18 month sample) to November 2002 while the 
second sample ran from July 2001(12 month sample) and January 2001 (18 month 
sample) to June 2002iii. 
 
The post-change period runs from March 2003 and ends at the end of 
February 2004 (12 month sample) or August 2004 (18 month sample).  The delay in 
starting the post-change period following the introduction of the act is to control for 
delays in the implementation of the act. By the start of March the provisions of the 
SMAA had been completely introduced, therefore, the full impact should be observed 
in the estimated parameters.  
 
Table 1 gives sample summary statistics on a number of indicators over both 
the full sample period and pre/post-change subsamples. As can be seen the average 
number of trades are around 19 per day, with a median value of 11, substantially 
smaller than the median value of 66 observed in MRR for US stocks. The average 
dollar spread for the sample is relatively low at 2.6c per share, however, given the 
low share prices (around NZ$3 per share), we observe a very large percentage 
spread, averaging 1.19%. These percentage spreads are much higher than spreads 
observed in other studies. MRR observe a percentage of around 0.6%, similar to 
results found by Ahn et al. (2002) and Brockman and Chung (1999) who consider 
markets with limit order books. When we separate the sample into pre- and post-
change we observe a significant drop in both absolute and percentage spreads. 
However, we do not observe a significant change in the other market variables 
(number of trades and price level) implying that market conditions have remained 
similar. Dollars spreads drop by nearly a quarter, with a 0.25% decline in average 
percentage spread. Finally, we observe evidence of a significant downward trend in 
the median volatility in daily prices pre- and post-change, although we observe a 
slight increase in average volatility. This implies that absent a handful of companies, 
the majority of the sample appears to be less volatile following the new regulations.  
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V. RESULTS 
 
If the change in legislation has reduced the incidence and profitability of insider 
trading, it would be expected that the proportion of the spread accounted for by 
information asymmetry would have decreased between the pre- and post-change 
subperiods. Table 2 gives details of the parameter estimates employing both the full 
sample period, and the pre and post-change sub-periods. Overall, all parameter 
estimates have low standard errors suggesting the parameters are estimated with 
great accuracy. Hence the low liquidity of stock in the sample causes no estimation 
problems. Further, Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001) find that MRR gives 
improbable values 18% of the time. In our sample, however, we find on average 
implausible component estimates in only around 5%.  
 
The full sample estimates show that the average proportion of information 
asymmetry is over 58%, although the median value is higher at 60%. This suggests 
that a handful of stocks have a lower proportion, which has driven the average down. 
This pattern is common across the estimates regardless of the length or timing of the 
sample period.  
 
The influence of the change in regulations that occurred can be seen in the 
differences in the parameter estimates in the pre- and post-change sub-samples. The 
information asymmetry component, , is lower after the introduction of the laws with a 
decrease of nearly 0.2. This effect is also observed in the decrease in the median 
value. The decrease in   has also resulted in a reduction in the proportion of 
information asymmetry (IA) between the pre- and post-change periods despite the 
concurrent decrease in the mean value of  , representing order-processing and 
inventory holding costs.  
 
In the pre-change subperiod, nearly 59% of the spread is attributable to 
adverse selection costs. This is higher than has been found in most other studies of 
the components of the spreads. IA has typically been observed to make up less than 
50% of the spread regardless of the model followed and the markets studied. For the 
US studies have found IA proportion between 35-50% (Stoll (1989) 43%, MRR 35-
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51%, Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) 43%, Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) 
39.2%, Kim and Ogden (1996) 50%). Similar results are found for London (Menyah 
and Paudyal (2000) 47%), Tokyo (Ahn et al. (2002) between 44-57%) and Hong 
Kong Stock Exchanges (Brockman and Chung (1999) 33%).   
 
After the regulatory change, the IA component has decreased by 
approximately 4% to 55%, still higher than found in other markets. This indicates that 
while the changes have had an impact, insider trading is either still more prevalent 
here than in other markets. Another possibility is that, as was observed in Bushman 
et al. (2005), there is some confidence effect where improvements aren’t fully 
realised until the laws have been enforced. The decrease in the proportion of IA is 
also apparent in the median value which decreased by 5%. The Wald statistics, 
contained in Panel B, support the decrease observed in both ș and the proportion. 
Nearly half of the sample had a significant decrease in their ș parameter, while close 
to 60% had a significant decline in the proportion of the spread made up of 
information asymmetry costs.  
 
An interesting point though is the decrease in . This represents a reduction in 
the order-processing and inventory costs. This could indicate a possible increase in 
the amount of liquidity in the market in the absence of other changes affecting these 
costs. This is in line with the major proposed benefit of the SMAA, an increase in 
confidence in the market and by extension liquidity. However, this improvement 
appears limited to a handful of companies, as indicated by the contrary median 
figures and the results of the Wald statistics. The Wald statistics show that while 
more companies had decreases in   than had increases, the majority of companies 
had no significant change.  
 
A number of studies have argued that insider trading is greater in smaller and 
less liquid companies (Friederich, Gregory, Matako and Tonks, 2002; Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001). The lack of attention received by these companies from the market 
allows greater movement from the true price which insiders can exploit to earn larger 
profits. If the new regulations have been effective, therefore, we would expect to see 
the greatest reductions in the information asymmetry component from those 
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companies where the changes will have resulted in the largest negative impact on 
insiders. To examine this we sort the results into two sub-samples based on the 
number of trades made over the sample period. We took the top and bottom 30 firms 
leaving the remaining 10 out of the examination to create a clear distinction between 
the groups. These results are shown in Panel C and conform to the belief that those 
companies with the greatest IA have been impacted most. The companies with low 
trades start with a much higher level of information asymmetry, 66% of the spread 
compared to 52% for high liquidity stocks. The impact of the new laws is also much 
greater with around a 7% reduction in both the mean and median for the low liquidity 
stocks, while high trade stocks see a less than 1% decrease in the mean and just 
over 4% in the median.  
 
We also sort parameter estimates based on the proportion of asymmetry in 
the pre-change period to see if the effects were greatest for those stocks with the 
most asymmetry. Again we consider the top and bottom 30 firms. The results are 
even more pronounced in this case with virtually all of the reduction in the information 
asymmetry costs of spreads coming from those firms with high asymmetry to start 
with. What is interesting is the increase in the proportion of IA observed in the 
median of the low asymmetry group. This is a result of a quite large decrease in the 
order-processing and inventory holding costs observed in this group making IA a 
proportionally larger cost. Both sorts show strong evidence of relationship between 
the level of asymmetry and the level of improvement following the introduction of the 
new laws.  
 
Finally, Figure 1 shows the proportion of IA plotted on a 12 month rolling 
basis. The sample is again split and the rolling proportions for the low and high trade 
groups are plotted along with the full sample results. The graph shows a steep and 
long-lived decline in the average proportion of both the full sample and the low trade 
firms starting almost immediately after the introduction of the new laws. High trade 
firms on the other hand show only a very slight decrease in the IA component around 
the time of the introduction of the new laws and towards the end of the sample period 
have higher proportions than the pre-change period. The timing of the decreases for 
the low trade firms and the size of the decrease certainly suggest the new regulations 
have been effective in reducing the IA component of the spreads.  
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As a robustness check we examine the information asymmetry cost component of 
the spreads using an alternate model. In this case we employed the Glosten and 
Harris (1988) model which has similar advantages to that of MRR for estimating 
spread components in a limit order driven market. Their model is also a trade 
indicator model with the added feature that both the information asymmetry and 
transitory component (which combines the effects of order-processing and inventory 
holding costs) are linear functions of the volume traded. The basic model can be 
expressed as  
 
 tttttttt VxxVxxp  ++++= 1010       (5) 
 
where Vt is the volume of the trade at time t, and t captures the arrival of new 
information and the effects of price discreteness. Under this model the information 
asymmetry cost component is )+(2 10 tV  and the transitory component is 
)+(2 10 tV . We estimate (5) using ordinary least squares. Similar to (3), there is 
auto-correlation in the error term of the model, therefore we compute standard errors 
with Newey-West adjustments. We also truncated the sample as per de Jong, Nijman 
and Roell (1996) by removing all transactions that had twice the median volume 
traded. This is to remove the effect of large trades as discussed in Hausman, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1992).  
 
The results in Table 3 present the Glosten and Harris (1988) models 
parameter estimates and the proportion of information asymmetry. As per the 
findings of the MRR model we find that the introduction of the act has had an impact 
on the spread cost components. The Glosten and Harris (1988) estimates are 
however lower than those found with the MRR which is consistent with other studies 
(Ahn et al., 2002). We do observe significant decreases in both the components 
making up the information asymmetry component, 0 and 1. The reduction in these 
values results in a significant reduction in the proportion of the spread IA composes, 
down by 1.5%. The patterns that we observe are therefore virtually identical between 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) and the MRR estimates.  
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The model of bid-ask decomposition from MRR also allows the influence of 
the various sources of price volatility to be determined. They note that price volatility 
is driven by variance in public news shocks and by microstructure frictions. In 
particular there are 3 major frictions that work on the variance in prices, price 
discreteness, trading costs and information asymmetry. If the SMAA has been 
effective in reducing the amount of informational asymmetry in the market, then it 
would be expected that the portion of price volatility caused by IA should also have 
been reduced.  
 
As per Madhavan et al. (1997) we add two extra parameters to equation 4. 
The first is a term to measure volatility caused by news shocks, 2 , while the second 
measures the effect of price discreteness on volatility, 2 . The variance of price 
changes follows from (3) as 
 
]))((2)())[(1(2]var[ 2222    tp , (6) 
 
where Ȝ measures the variance of the trade indicator. To identify the additional 
parameters, two extra orthogonality conditions are added 
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The first defines the variance of the transaction price changes and the second 
deals with serial covariances in the pricing errors.  
 
Rearranging (6) to solve for each of the price volatility components we get the 
following terms: news shocks ( 2 ); price discreteness ( 22  ); information asymmetry 
( 22 )1)(1(   ); trading costs ( 2)1)(1(2   ); and the interaction term 
( )1)(1(2 2  ) which measure the contribution of each source of volatility to the 
total variance observed.  
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Table 4 sets out the relative contributions to price volatility as well as the mean 
and median values for each of the five components. Following the introduction of the 
new laws, we find a drop in total price volatility. The proportion of volatility attributable 
to market frictions has increased by about 5%. However, the percentage of 
information asymmetry to market frictions has decreased significantly over the two 
sub-periods. The increase of the proportion of market frictions is mainly driven by an 
increase in trading costs and a decrease in the public information component. 
 
Panel B presents the number of firms that had increases or decreases in the 
proportion of each cost making up price volatility. Nearly 70% of companies had a 
reduction in the contribution of IA to price volatility providing further support for the 
notion that the new regulations have reduced information asymmetry in the markets 
generally. The worsening in mean trading costs is also reflected in the 40 companies 
that had an increase in the proportion suggesting this increase is also a global effect. 
The other decreasing components, news announcements and price discreteness, 
both had marginally more decreases than increases while the reverse was true for 
the interaction term.  
 
We also sorted the contributions to volatility by both the number of trades and 
the pre-change proportion of asymmetry in the spreads. As can be seen in Panel C, 
while the mean proportions of IA between the low and high trades has decreased by 
similar amounts, the median decreases are vastly different. High trades see only a 
1% decrease after the introduction of the new laws, low trades however observe a 
5.5% decrease suggesting a much more profound impact on a wider number of firms. 
The results for the high and low asymmetry sorts show little impact on those firms 
with the least asymmetry but nearly an 8% decrease for those with the most 
asymmetry pre-change. Again the results suggest that while there has been a 
general decrease in the impact of IA on price volatility, the effect seems to be related 
to the level of insider trading before the change.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of a significant tightening in regulations targeting 
all aspects of insider trading and dealing. We explore this issue in the context of New 
Zealand, a small, illiquid and previously poorly regulated market with respect to 
insider trading. Recent changes in the regulatory regime provide an ideal setting to 
examine the impact of effective government intervention on the cost of trading. We 
decompose the separate components of the spread and find evidence of a strong 
relationship between the efficacy of insider trading rules and proportion of the spread 
attributable to information asymmetry. These results are robust over different model 
specifications. Splitting the sample on the basis of liquidity (number of trades) and 
pre-change information asymmetry, we find that these results are mainly driven by 
illiquid firms who suffer form high information asymmetry, which implies that 
government intervention is most beneficial for these firms. Lastly, we find a significant 
drop in the percentage of market frictions that is attributable to information 
asymmetry. 
 
Overall the results showed a decrease in trading costs that are mainly driven 
by a decline in information asymmetry. The market setting of New Zealand suggests 
the experience of introducing effective measures to limit insiders may be widely 
applicable. Many countries suffer a similar lack of appropriate regulation and/or 
political will to address insider trading. While the liquidity of the New Zealand market 
is not representative of other developed markets, a majority of stocks listed on these 
markets may suffer from a similar lack of market attention. For these stocks and 
countries effective government intervention may be beneficial.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the sample companies 
Full Sample Pre Change Post Change
Average Transactions Per Day
Mean 18.82 18.66 19.54
Median 11.21 12.02 11.88
Std Deviation 20.90 22.59 20.79
1st Quartile 5.94 5.41 6.51
3rd Quartile 23.19 22.68 24.34
Average Prices
Mean 3.14 3.17 3.16
Median 2.04 2.01 1.97
Std Deviation 3.71 3.88 3.71
1st Quartile 1.11 1.10 1.05
3rd Quartile 3.52 3.30 4.25
Average Spread
Mean 0.0255 0.0290 0.0222 ***
Median 0.0160 0.0175 0.0142 **
Std Deviation 0.0288 0.0313 0.0253
1st Quartile 0.0105 0.0109 0.0097
3rd Quartile 0.0318 0.0373 0.0260
Average Percentage Spread
Mean 1.19% 1.35% 1.10% ***
Median 0.88% 1.04% 0.74% **
Std Deviation 1.03% 1.13% 0.99%
1st Quartile 0.63% 0.67% 0.54%
3rd Quartile 1.31% 1.67% 1.16%
Volatility in Daily Prices
Mean 0.0260 0.0256 0.0275
Median 0.0165 0.0177 0.0138 ***
Std Deviation 0.0012 0.0009 0.0017
1st Quartile 0.0138 0.0144 0.0115
3rd Quartile 0.0246 0.0255 0.0226  
Full Sample includes all trades between January 2001 and August 2004. Pre-
Change includes all trades between January 2001 and November 2002. Post-
Change includes all trades between March 2003 and August 2004. Average 
Prices was measured as the cross-sectional average of the average daily 
closing share price over the sample period. Average Spread is the cross-
sectional average of the bid-ask spread at the time of a trade. Average 
Percentage Spread wais measured as the cross-sectional average of the bid – 
ask price divided by the midpoint of the spread. Average Effective Spread is 
measured as per MRR as )2)(1(   . Volatility in Daily Prices was 
measured as the standard deviation of the change in the closing daily price. *** 
indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%. Significance of means 
were calculated between the pre and post change samples using the matched 
pairs t-test. Significance of the medians were calculated using the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test. 
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Table 2: GMM Parameter Estimates  
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Panel B: Wald Statistics of Difference
Full Sample Pre Change Post Change 
ș
Mean 0.1614 0.1558 0.1369 * Sig Decrease 5% 31
Std Err (average) 0.0109 0.0174 0.0140 Sig Decrease 1% 21
Std Dev 0.1573 0.1136 0.1343 Sig Increase 5% 5
Median 0.1188 0.1199 0.1036 * Sig Increase 1% 5
ĭ
Mean 0.1436 0.1649 0.1415 Sig Decrease 5% 17
Std Err (average) 0.0123 0.0199 0.0159 Sig Decrease 1% 14
Std Dev 0.1645 0.2528 0.1690 Sig Increase 5% 12
Median 0.0663 0.0568 0.0681 Sig Increase 1% 7
ȡ
Mean 0.4135 0.4120 0.4081 Sig Decrease 5% 16
Std Err (average) 0.0104 0.0174 0.0154 Sig Decrease 1% 13
Std Dev 0.0888 0.0951 0.0924 Sig Increase 5% 12
Median 0.3932 0.3939 0.3877 Sig Increase 1% 11
Proportion of Information Asymmetry
Mean 0.5801 0.5893 0.5518 ** Sig Decrease 5% 40
Std Err (average) 0.0238 0.0587 0.0638 Sig Decrease 1% 39
Std Dev 0.2161 0.2266 0.2213 Sig Increase 5% 16
Median 0.6063 0.6246 0.5743 ** Sig Increase 1% 16
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Sorted by Number of Trades
Low Trades High Trades
Pre-Change Post-Change Pre-Change
Proportion of Information Asymmetry
Mean 0.6650 0.5992 ** 0.5210 0.5121
Std Err (average) 0.0692 0.0767 0.0504 0.0498
Std Dev 0.2053 0.2247 0.2264 0.2092
Median 0.7240 0.6526 ** 0.5567 0.5103
Panel D: Parameter Estimates Sorted by Pre-Change Proportion of Information Asymmetry
Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry
Pre-Change Post-Change Pre-Change
Proportion of Information Asymmetry
Mean 0.4131 0.4045 0.7716 0.6934    ***
Std Err (average) 0.0199 0.0233 0.0997 0.1029
Std Dev 0.1527 0.1851 0.0890 0.1483
Median 0.4338 0.4597 0.7511 0.6741    **
Post-Change
Post-Change
 
Panel A presents the parameter estimates for the sample of 70 companies over the indicated time period (month and year) for the three parameters 
of interest, ș, the asymmetric information component of the spread, ĭ, the cost per share of trading and ȡ, the autocorrelation of the order flow. 
The proportion of information asymmetry was calculated as the cross-sectional average of ș /( ș + ĭ ) and the standard error as the cross-sectional 
average of '
22ˆ,ˆ22 )(
,
)(
1
)(
,
)(
1 




















V
where  ˆ,ˆV is the estimated covariance matrix of the GMM estimators. 
Panel B presents the number of companies that observed either a statistically significant improvement or decline in the parameter estimates. The 
difference was calculated between the pre-change period from June 2001 to November 2002 and the post-change period from March 2003 to 
August 2004.  The standard errors were adjusted using the NeweyWest (1987) corrections for heteroskedasticity as detailed in Hamilton (1994). 
Prices were scaled in the estimation procedure by 100. Low and High Trades contain the estimates of the lowest and highest 30 companies when 
sorted by number of trades. Low Asymmetry and High Asymmetry contain the lowest and highest 30 companies when sorted by pre-change 
proportion of information asymmetry. *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 1% using the 
matched pairs t-test for the difference between pre and post-change. 
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Table 3: Glosten and Harris Model Parameter Estimates 
Panel A: Average GH Parameter Estimates
Full Sample Pre-Change Post Change
 0 
Mean 0.4216 0.4823 0.4619
Std Dev 0.0188 0.0481 0.0368
Median 0.2904 0.3088 0.3183
 1
Mean -0.0027 -0.0129 -0.0004 **
Std Dev 0.0079 0.0226 0.0207
Median -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0007 *
 
Mean 0.1390 0.1692 0.1515 *
Std Dev 0.0169 0.0329 0.0227
Median 0.1167 0.1105 0.1247
 1
Mean 0.0056 0.0061 0.0019 *
Std Dev 0.0106 0.0154 0.0127
Median 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0003
Panel B: Spread Cost Components
Asymmetric Information 0.2880 0.3699 0.3087 **
Order-Processing 0.8352 0.8988 0.9137
Proportion 0.2817 0.2920 0.2776 **  
Measures the parameters estimates for the 70 sample companies based on the Glosten and Harris 
model (1988) defined as tttttttt VxxVxxp  ++++= 1010  . Asymmetric information 
is measured as )+(2 10 tV while order-processing is measured as )+(2 10 tV . Proportion is 
measured as 
)(2)(2
)(2
1010
10
tt
t
VV
V



 . *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant 
at 5%, * indicates significant at 1% using the matched pairs t-test for the difference between pre and 
post-change. 
 18
 
Fi
gu
re
 1
: 1
2 
M
on
th
 R
ol
lin
g 
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 
0.
48
00
0.
50
00
0.
52
00
0.
54
00
0.
56
00
0.
58
00
0.
60
00
0.
62
00
0.
64
00
D
ec
-0
1
Ju
n-
02
D
ec
-0
2
Ju
n-
03
D
ec
-0
3
Ju
n-
04
Lo
w
 T
ra
de
H
ig
h 
Tr
ad
e
To
ta
l
 
P
re
se
nt
s 
12
 m
on
th
 ro
lli
ng
 c
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l a
ve
ra
ge
 p
ro
po
rti
on
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 fo
r a
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 7
0 
N
ZX
 c
om
pa
ni
es
. L
ow
 (H
ig
h)
 T
ra
de
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
ro
lli
ng
 
es
tim
at
es
 fo
r t
he
 3
0 
lo
w
es
t (
hi
gh
es
t) 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 w
he
n 
so
rte
d 
by
 n
um
be
r o
f t
ra
de
s.
 
 19 
Table 4: Components of Price Volatility 
Panel A: Volatility Proportions and Component Estimates Panel B: Breakdown of Changes
Full Sample Pre Change Post Change
Public Information
Proportion of Total Volatility 0.5403 0.5644 0.5101 * Prop Decreased 35
Standard Deviation 0.2159 0.1898 0.1977 Prop Increased 26
Median 0.5554 0.5801 0.5419
Price Discreteness
Proportion of Market Friction 0.4796 0.4766 0.4667 Prop Decreased 33
Standard Deviation 0.1859 0.1965 0.1950 Prop Increased 28
Median 0.5219 0.5290 0.5020
Information Asymmetry
Proportion of Market Friction 0.2035 0.2030 0.1705 * Prop Decreased 48
Standard Deviation 0.1890 0.1553 0.1383 Prop Increased 13
Median 0.1486 0.1771 0.1381 *
Transaction Cost
Proportion of Market Friction 0.1416 0.1392 0.1761 ** Prop Decreased 21
Standard Deviation 0.1646 0.1596 0.1890 Prop Increased 40
Median 0.0891 0.0814 0.0972
Interaction
Proportion of Market Friction 0.1753 0.1812 0.1867 Prop Decreased 29
Standard Deviation 0.0791 0.0872 0.0843 Prop Increased 32
Median 0.1806 0.1790 0.1917
Total Volatility 0.0053 0.0057 0.0048
Proportion Market Friction 0.4597 0.4356 0.4899
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Sorted by Number of Trades
Low Trades High Trades
Pre-Change Post-Change Pre-Change
Information Asymmetry
Proportion of Volatility 0.2315 0.1999 * 0.1762 0.1487
Standard Deviation 0.1382 0.1376 0.1763 0.1381
Median 0.2142 0.1595 * 0.1247 0.1156
Panel D: Parameter Estimates Sorted by Pre-Change Proportion of Information Asymmetry
Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry
Pre-Change Post-Change Pre-Change
Information Asymmetry
Proportion of Volatility 0.0867 0.0888 0.3117 0.2480    **
Standard Deviation 0.0532 0.0686 0.1571 0.1515
Median 0.0787 0.0721 0.2796 0.1985    *
Post-Change
Post-Change
Presents 
the five components of the price volatility, news shocks ( 2 ), price discreteness ( 22  ), information asymmetry, 
( 22 )1)(1(   ), trading costs, ( 2)1)(1(2   ), and the interaction term, ( )1)(1(2 2  ), for the sample of 70 
companies. The proportion of volatility is cross-sectional average of the component value divided by the total volatility. Low and High 
Trades contain the estimates of the lowest and highest 30 companies when sorted by number of trades. Low Asymmetry and High 
Asymmetry contain the lowest and highest 30 companies when sorted by pre-change proportion of information asymmetry.  
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 Details on the structure of the previous regime and the exact nature of the changes 
can be found in Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski (2005). 
2 Glosten and Harris (1988) differ in this respect, because they consider all 
information in the arrival of a trade as a surprise.  
3 As the results for both pre-change periods and both the 18 and 12 month samples 
were virtually identical we report only the results of the 18 month sample and the pre-
change period that ran from June 2001 to November 2002. 
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